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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
Jessie T. Wickham, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case # 990294-CA 
Priority # 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE AND JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant was charged by Information with Contributing to 
the Delinquency of a Minor, a Class B Misdemeanor. Defendant 
appeared in the Seventh District Juvenile Court on this charge, 
entered a plea of not guilty, and requested that a public 
defender be appointed for his representation. Defendant was 
released on bail and failed to appear for trial and a bench 
warrant was issued. In January of 1999, the Defendant was picked 
up on an outstanding warrant and this matter was set for trial. 
Defendant was found guilty of Contributing to the Delinquency of 
a Minor, a Class B Misdemeanor, and was sentenced to serve 12 0 
days in the Grand County Jail. The Defendant appeals from this 
sentence. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2A-3(E) (1953), as amended. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1. Did the Defendant knowingly and intelligently 
waive his Constitutional right to appointed counsel? 
Standard of Review. Whether a waiver of counsel was made 
knowingly and intelligently is a mixed question of law and fact 
and is reviewed with some deference to the Trial Court. State v. 
Heaton. 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 
(Utah 1994). 
The issue of whether a waiver of counsel was made knowingly 
and intelligently does not require preservation at the Trial 
Court for purposes of appeal. 
Issue 2. Was the evidence sufficient to support the finding 
that Defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt? 
Standard of Review. Whether the evidence is sufficient is a 
mixed question of fact and law reviewed with some deference to 
the Trial Court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) . 
The issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to support 
the finding that Defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
does not require preservation at the Trial Court for purposes of 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about June 17, 1997, the Defendant was charged by 
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Information with Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor, a 
Class B Misdemeanor. (R002) On June 26, 1997, an arraignment was 
held in Seventh District Juvenile Court on this charge. (R009) 
Defendant failed to appear and a bench warrant was issued with 
bail in the amount of $1000.00. (R010, R014-015) 
On July 10, 1997, a second arraignment hearing was held at 
which Defendant appeared. (R011) The Defendant entered a plea 
of not guilty and requested that a public defender be appointed 
for his representation. (R011) On July 10, 1997, Defendant was 
released on bail and trial was set for September 23, 1997. (R012-
013) 
The Defendant made contact with the Grand County Public 
Defender, William L. Schultz, who served a discovery request in 
the matter on the Grand County Attorney. (R019) On September 
23, 1997, Defendant failed to appear for trial (R018) and a bench 
warrant was issued with no bail. (R023) 
In January of 1999, the Defendant was picked up on an 
outstanding warrant, appeared before the Judge on February 3, 
1999, and the matter was set for trial to commence on February 
25, 1999. (R025) Notice of the February 25, 1999, trial was sent 
to William L. Schultz (R026) who moved to withdraw from the case 
as he was no longer the Grand County Public Defender. (R028) The 
Court granted the motion (R02 9-03 0) but did not appoint or give 
notice to the new Public Defender (counsel herein) about the 
-3-
Defendant's upcoming trial. 
On February 25, 1999, Defendant, who was incarcerated, stood 
trial without the assistance of an attorney. (Tr. at p. 3) The 
Court asked the Defendant if he was representing himself and the 
Defendant responded, "I guess so." (Tr. at p. 3, lines 3-5) The 
Court then asked the Defendant if he still wished to proceed to 
trial and the Defendant responded, "Yes, sir." (Tr. at p. 3, 
lines 6-7) The Court then proceeded to trial. 
Officer Shawn Hansen was called by the prosecution. (Tr. at 
p. 3) He was examined and testified as to his roll in the 
matter.(Tr. at pp. 3-6) Officer Hansen stated that he was 
dispatched on a disturbance call where he was advised individuals 
were drinking beer in a parking lot. (Tr. at p. 4, lines 7-8) 
Officer Hansen testified that the individual who called in the 
disturbance stated that it was a red car that she was mainly 
calling about and she pointed it out to Officer Hansen when he 
arrived. (Tr. at p. 4, lines 15-17) Officer Hansen also 
recognized a grey truck that was in the same parking lot and 
testified that he knew it belonged to the Defendant. (Tr. at p. 
4, lines 13-14) Officer Hansen then made contact with the 
Defendant and a passenger in the grey truck. (Tr. at pp. 4-5) 
Officer Hansen testified that the Defendant was consuming 
beer in the parked vehicle in that he had an open beer can and 
there was also a beer can next to the passenger and numerous beer 
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cans inside the truck. (Tr. at p. 5, lines 3-5) Officer Hansen 
then inquired as to the Defendant's age and the passenger's age 
and found that Defendant was 21 years of age and the passenger 
was 14 or 15 years of age. (Tr. at p. 5, lines 6-12) 
Officer Hansen testified that both occupants of the truck 
had alcoholic beverage on their breath and that the juvenile 
tested .040 on the portable breath test. (Tr. at p. 5-6) Two 
photographs of the beer cans in the car were then introduced 
collectively as "Exhibit 1". (Tr. at p. 6, line 9) After the 
results of the breath test, the juvenile informed Officer Hansen 
that he had consumed one and one-half beers, but wouldn't tell 
the officer where he had gotten them from. (Tr. at p. 6, lines 5-
6,17-19). The testimony Officer Hansen gave did not indicate 
whether he questioned the juvenile as to when he had consumed the 
one and one half beers or whether the juvenile said it wasn't 
given to him by Defendant. 
The Defendant did not cross-examine Officer Hansen and did 
not call any witnesses or take the stand in his own behalf. (Tr. 
at p. 7, lines 5-12) The Court found the Defendant guilty of 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a Class B 
Misdemeanor. (R033-034, Tr. at p. 7) The Court inquired of the 
Grand County prosecutor and the Defendant as to their individual 
positions with regard to sentencing. (Tr. at pp. 7-8) The state 
recommended a sentence of 90 days in jail; however, the Court 
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ordered the Defendant to serve 12 0 days in the Grand County Jail 
and pay $500 within two months of being released from jail. (Tr. 
at p. 7-9) 
Following sentencing, the Defendant inquired of the Judge as 
to a possibility for a retrial and the Court-appointed counsel he 
was supposed to have representing him. (Tr. at p. 9, lines 21-
24) The Court informed the Defendant that he had waived his 
right to a new trial at the beginning when he stated that he 
would proceed without counsel. (Tr. at p. 10, lines 1-3) 
Current counsel was appointed to represent the Defendant on 
or about March 29, 1999, (R040-044) after the Defendant filed a 
pro se Notice of Appeal (R03 5) regarding the aforementioned 
decision of the Court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to 
the assistance of counsel in the trial held on the charges of 
Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor. The Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917-918 (Utah 1998) 
instructs Trial Courts in this regard as follows: 
. . .before the court may permit the defendant to 
proceed without the assistance of counsel, the court 
must conduct a thorough inquiry of the defendant to 
fulfill its duty of insuring that the defendant's 
waiver of counsel is knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily made. In making this determination, the 
court must advise the defendant of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation "so that the 
record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing 
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and his choice is made with eyes open. ' " Faretta, 422 
U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (quoting Adams v. United 
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 
87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)); see Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 
U.S. 708, 723-24, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948); 
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187-88 (Utah 1987). 
In addition, the trial court should (1) advise the 
defendant of his constitutional right to the assistance 
of counsel, as well as his constitutional right to 
represent himself; (2) ascertain that the defendant 
possesses the intelligence and capacity to understand 
and appreciate the consequences of the decision to 
represent himself, including the expectation that the 
defendant will comply with technical rules and the 
recognition that presenting a defense is not just a 
matter of telling one's story; and (3) ascertain that 
the defendant comprehends the nature of the charges and 
proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and 
any additional facts essential to a broad understanding 
of the case. See State v. Frye, 224 Conn. 253, 617 
A.2d 1382, 1386-87 (1992); see also Frampton, 737 P.2d 
at 187-88. (FN5) 
At the beginning of the trial, the Court made an inadequate 
inquiry of the defendant regarding his desire to proceed without 
the assistance of counsel. The inquiry lacked the necessary 
components as listed above to allow the Court to make the 
determination as to whether Defendant "knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily" waived his right to counsel. The Court failed 
to inform the Defendant of his sixth amendment rights and, 
therefore, violated them. Under Heaton. Defendant is entitled to 
a new trial. 
In addition, insufficient evidence was presented to warrant 
a finding of guilty. No testimony was offered nor evidence 
presented to the Trial Court that showed that Defendant 
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solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally 
aided, or acted with the minor involved to violate a specific 
state, federal, or local law. (Tr. at pp. 3-10) This being the 
definition of the charge of Contributing to the Delinquency of a 
Minor, Defendant should have been found not guilty. If the 
findings are against the clear weight of the evidence, the 
Defendant is entitled to have the verdict set aside by this 
Court. State v. Strieby. 790 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah App. 1990). 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED. 
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917 (Utah 1998) sets forth 
the following: 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees an accused the right to the assistance of 
counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-
44, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.ed.2d, 799 (1963); Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 
1461 (1938). . . 
The right to have the assistance of counsel in a 
criminal trial is a fundamental constitutional right 
which must be jealously protected by the trial court. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated: 
The constitutional right of an accused to be 
represented by counsel invokes, of itself the 
protection of a trial court, in which the 
accused--whose life or liberty is at stake--
is without counsel. . . Johnson, 3 04 U.S. at 
465, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (emphasis added). 
In the hearing held July 10, 1997, the Defendant appeared 
for an arraignment hearing and requested the appointment of 
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counsel. (R011) A Trial date of September 23, 1997, was set. 
The Defendant failed to appear at said trial and a bench warrant 
was issued (R018). 
In January of 1999, the Defendant was picked up on the 
warrant and the previous public defender moved to withdraw on the 
basis that he no longer was the contract public defender in Grand 
County (R028). The Court failed to appoint or give notice to the 
new contract public defender prior to the Defendant's trial. 
(R040-044) The Court allowed the Defendant to represent himself 
even though the Defendant had previously requested the assistance 
of counsel and was only without counsel due to the Court's 
failure to appoint the new public defender after granting 
Defendant's previous public defender's motion to withdraw. (R018, 
Tr. at p. 3) 
The Court did not "jealously protect" the Defendant's right 
to the assistance of counsel. Heaton at 917. If it had, it 
would have recognized the fact that Defendant had been 
represented by Court-appointed counsel previously in the same 
matter and at the very least would have inquired as to why 
counsel was not present at the trial. Not only did the Trial 
Court fail to make such an inquiry, but additionally allowed the 
client to represent himself after he had previously requested 
Court-appointed counsel in the same matter. The Trial Court 
failed to "jealously protect" the Defendant's sixth amendment 
-9-
rights and, as a result, violated them. Id. As such, Defendant 
is entitled to a new trial. 
II. DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVE HIS 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917-918 (Utah 1998) states 
the following: 
. . .before the court may permit the defendant to 
proceed without the assistance of counsel, the court 
must conduct a thorough inquiry of the defendant to 
fulfill its duty of insuring that the defendant's 
waiver of counsel is knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily made. In making this determination, the 
court must advise the defendant of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation "so that the 
record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing 
and his choice is made with eyes open.' " Faretta, 422 
U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (quoting Adams v. United 
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 
87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)); see Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 
U.S. 708, 723-24, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948); 
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187-88 (Utah 1987). 
In addition, the trial court should (1) advise the 
defendant of his constitutional right to the assistance 
of counsel, as well as his constitutional right to 
represent himself; (2) ascertain that the defendant 
possesses the intelligence and capacity to understand 
and appreciate the consequences of the decision to 
represent himself, including the expectation that the 
defendant will comply with technical rules and the 
recognition that presenting a defense is not just a 
matter of telling one's story; and (3) ascertain that 
the defendant comprehends the nature of the charges and 
proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and 
any additional facts essential to a broad understanding 
of the case. See State v. Frye, 224 Conn. 253, 617 
A.2d 1382, 1386-87 (1992); see also Frampton, 737 P.2d 
at 187-88. (FN5) 
The record in this matter shows that the colloquy as 
indicated above never occurred in the instant case between 
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Defendant and the Court prior to the Court allowing Defendant to 
proceed without the assistance of counsel. The entire dialogue 
regarding this issue consisted of the following: 
THE COURT: We're here for trial on contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor. Mr. Wickham, are you 
representing yourself? 
MR. WICKHAM: I guess so. 
THE COURT: Do you still wish to proceed to trial? 
MR. WICKHAM: Yes, sir. 
(Tr. at p. 3, lines 1-7) 
A. THE COURT FAILED TO INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE DANGERS 
AND DISADVANTAGES OF SELF - REPRESENTATION . 
First, the Court was required to conduct a thorough inquiry 
of the Defendant by advising the Defendant of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation. It is apparent that the 
simplistic colloquy at the beginning of the trial failed to 
include this essential element (Tr. at p. 3, lines 1-7). 
In Heaton, the facts surrounding this issue are quite 
similar. The Defendant did not want to proceed with his Court-
appointed counsel and had requested new counsel be appointed to 
represent him. The Judge advised Heaton of his right to self-
representation, refused to permit Heatonfs attorney to withdraw, 
indicated to Heaton that he was requiring counsel to remain as 
standby counsel to assist Heaton if he wanted the assistance, and 
indicated that Heaton was free to choose to handle trial matters 
on his own but that the Court would make a record of Heaton's 
decision to proceed pro se. Id. at 914. 
-11-
On the first day of trial after the jury had been selected, 
the Court "strongly advised Heaton to allow defense counsel to 
cross-examine the State's witnesses inasmuch as Heaton would 
certainly not be as effective as defense counsel." Id. at 919. 
The Utah Supreme Court did recognize this advice as appropriate, 
but determined that it was only one of the disadvantages of self-
representation--i.e. not having experience and expertise at 
cross-examining witnesses. Id. 
In Mr. Wickham's case, the Judge chose to give Mr. Wickham 
advice after the trial regarding the notion that his waiver of 
counsel at the beginning of trial adversely affected his right to 
a new trial. This advice--even if considered as appropriate as 
the advice given in Heaton--nonetheless, was still only advising 
the Defendant of one of the disadvantages of self-representation. 
The Utah Supreme Court also recognized that the advice given 
in Heaton, though appropriate, was given after the Defendant's 
supposed waiver of counsel. As the Utah Supreme Court concluded, 
". . .before a trial court may permit a Defendant to proceed pro 
se, the Court must determine whether the Defendant competently 
waived counsel at the time of waiver, not after." Id. at 919. 
While the Judge's advice in Mr. Wickham's case may be 
considered "advising defendant of dangers and disadvantages" as 
Heaton requires, the Judge did not advise the Defendant until 
after the trial when it was too late for the Defendant to be able 
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to utilize that information in making the determination to 
represent himself. (Tr. at pp. 9-10) 
B. THE COURT FAILED TO ADVISE THE DEFENDANT OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
After having informed the Defendant of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation, the Court is to next 
"advise the defendant of his constitutional right to the 
assistance of counsel, as well as his constitutional right to 
represent himself." State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 917 (Utah 
1998) sets forth the following with regard to the importance of 
this requirement: 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees an accused the right to the assistance of 
counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-
44, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.ed.2d, 799 (1963); Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 
1461 (1938). . .However, the Sixth Amendment also 
guarantees an accused the right to self-representation, 
"provided only that he [or she] knowingly and 
intelligently forgoes his [or her] right to counsel." 
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173, 104 S.Ct. 944, 
79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984); see also Faretta v. California, 
422 U.S. 806, 807, 818, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 
(1975). 
The right to have the assistance of counsel in a 
criminal trial is a fundamental constitutional right 
which must be jealously protected by the trial court. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated: 
The constitutional right of an accused to be 
represented by counsel invokes, of itself the 
protection of a trial court, in which the 
accused--whose life or liberty is at stake--
is without counsel. This protecting duty-
imposes the serious and weighty 
responsibility upon the trial judge of 
determining whether there is an intelligent 
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and competent waiver by the accused. 
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019 
(emphasis added). 
As is evidenced by the simplistic colloquy preceding the 
trial (Tr. at p. 3, lines 1-7), the Court failed to properly 
advise the Defendant of his sixth amendment right to the 
assistance of counsel as well as his right to represent himself 
prior to proceeding with the trial. 
C. THE COURT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN THAT THE DEFENDANT 
POSSESSED THE INTELLIGENCE AND CAPACITY TO UNDERSTAND 
THE CONSEQUENCES. 
The next step the Court should take in determining that the 
Defendant is knowingly and intelligently making a waiver of 
counsel is for the Judge to "ascertain that the defendant 
possesses the intelligence and capacity to understand and 
appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent himself, 
including the expectation that the Defendant will comply with 
technical rules and the recognition that presenting a defense is 
not just a matter of telling one's story." State v. Heaton, 958 
P.2d 911, 918 (Utah 19 98). As Heaton states, the Judge must be 
able to determine that the Defendant has the "intelligence and 
capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences." For an 
appellate Court to determine whether this has occurred, a 
colloquy on the record is the preferred method of determining the 
validity of the waiver. State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 187-88 
(Utah 1987). Frampton set forth the following reasoning behind 
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this conclusion: 
. . .a colloquy on the record between the court and the 
accused is the preferred method of ascertaining the 
validity of a waiver because it insures that [the 
defendant] understand[s] the risks of self-
representation. . .Even absent such a colloquy, 
however, this Court will look at any evidence in the 
record which shows a defendant's actual awareness of 
the risks of proceeding pro se. 
Id. at 188. 
Again, as can be ascertained by the simplistic colloquy 
found on the record at the beginning of the trial in this matter, 
this essential element is also missing. (Tr. at p. 3, lines 1-7) 
It is a far stretch to believe that anyone could ascertain the 
intelligence or capacity of an individual who simply states "I 
guess so" and "Yes, sir." In fact, it could be assumed that the 
Defendant obviously didn't understand or appreciate the 
consequences when he inquired of the Judge as to a retrial on the 
matter. (Tr. at p. 9, lines 21-22) 
D. THE COURT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN THAT THE DEFENDANT 
POSSESSED THE INTELLIGENCE AND CAPACITY TO COMPLY WITH 
TECHNICAL RULES. 
As for compliance with the technical rules, the Judge failed 
to communicate any expectations to the Defendant with regard to 
his representation of himself. (Tr. at p. 3, lines 1-7) 
Additionally, it could be ascertained that the Defendant was not 
aware of the technical rules or the methods on presenting his own 
defense by the fact that he did not cross-examine the witness 
that was called nor did he call any witnesses or take the stand 
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on his own behalf. (Tr. at p. 7, lines 5-12) 
E. THE COURT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN THAT THE DEFENDANT 
COMPREHENDED THE NATURE OF THE CHARGES AND PROCEEDINGS, THE 
RANGE OF PERMISSIBLE PUNISHMENTS, AND ANY ADDITIONAL FACTS 
ESSENTIAL TO A BROAD UNDERSTANDING OF THE CASE. 
With regard to obtaining a valid waiver of counsel, the 
appellate Court in State v. Heaton, 958 P. 2d 911, 918 (Utah 1998) 
instructs the Trial Court as follows: 
. . . the court must advise the defendant of the dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation "so that the 
record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing 
and his choice is made with eyes open. ' " Faretta, 422 
U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (quoting Adams v. United 
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S. Ct. 236, 
87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)); see Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 
U.S. 708, 723-24, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948); 
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187-88 (Utah 1987). 
. . .the trial court should . . .(3) ascertain that the 
defendant comprehends the nature of the charges and 
proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and 
any additional facts essential to a broad understanding 
of the case. See State v. Frye, 224 Conn. 253, 617 
A.2d 1382, 1386-87 (1992); see also Frampton, 737 P.2d 
at 187-88. (FN5) 
(Emphasis added). 
The entire colloquy on the record in this matter occurring 
between the Court and the Defendant is as follows: 
THE COURT: We're here for trial on contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor. Mr. Wickham, are you 
representing yourself? 
MR. WICKHAM: I guess so. 
THE COURT: Do you still wish to proceed to trial? 
MR. WICKHAM: Yes, sir. 
A look once again a t t h i s s i m p l i s t i c co l l oquy , which 
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occurred at the beginning of the trial, shows that no inquiries 
were made by the Judge to ascertain the Defendant's comprehension 
of the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range of 
permissible punishments, or any additional facts essential to a 
broad understanding of the case. (Tr. at p. 3, lines 1-7) 
For the Court to establish that the defendant "knows what he 
is doing" and is making his choice "with eyes open," it is 
necessary for the Court to make a thorough inquiry as to whether 
the defendant has such a comprehension. Id. at 918. The Court 
simply stated the charges and that the matter was set for trial 
that day. The Judge then asked the Defendant if he would like to 
proceed without counsel. The Judge failed to simply inquire even 
as to whether the Defendant comprehended what he had stated. A 
simple l}Do you understand what I have just told you?" could have 
aided the Judge in making a proper determination as to whether 
the Defendant comprehended what was occurring. The Court had 
adequate information and time to obtain a valid waiver by making 
the appropriate inquiries of the Defendant, but failed to do so. 
Without knowledge of the Defendant's comprehension of the 
proceedings or the charges, it is impossible for anyone to 
ascertain that he could have "intelligently" waive his right to 
counsel. 
F. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL. 
After a thorough inquiry into the record in this matter, it 
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is apparent that the Defendant did not knowingly and 
intelligently waive his right to be represented by counsel at a 
trial on the charges. In Heaton, after making the determination 
that a valid waiver had not been obtained by the Trial Court, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that because the Trial Court failed to 
advise Heaton, at a minimum, of the dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation, Heaton did not validly waive his 
constitutional right to counsel. Id. at 919. Based upon this 
finding, they held that the Trial Court erred in permitting 
Heaton to proceed pro se and Heaton was granted a new trial. Id. 
at 919. Mr. Wickham, too, was never advised, at a minimum, of 
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and 
therefore did not validly waive his constitutional right to 
counsel. As with Heaton, Mr. Wickham, too, is entitled to a new 
trial on the matter. 
III. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE COURT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT 
FOR A FINDING OF GUILT. 
State v. Hawkins, 967 P.2d 966 (Utah App. 1998) states the 
following: 
When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, 
appellate Court reviews evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in light most 
favorable to verdict or jury, and will reverse jury 
conviction for insufficient evidence only when 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that defendant committed 
crime of which he was convicted. 
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State in Interest of K.K.H., 610 P.2d 849, 852 (Utah 1980), 
sets forth that the foregoing rule is the same whether a judge or 
jury sits as the fact-finder. State v. Brooks. 563 P.2d 799, 803 
(Utah 1977) clarifies what is meant by "reasonable doubt" as 
follows: 
A reasonable doubt is not a mere imaginary captious, or 
a possible doubt, but a fair doubt, based upon reason 
and common sense, and growing out of the testimony of 
the case. It is such a doubt as will leave the juror's 
mind, after careful examination of all the evidence, in 
such condition that he cannot say that he has an 
abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the 
defendant's guilt. 
In Mr. Wickham's case, one witness was called against him 
and one exhibit was presented to the Court. (Tr. at pp. 3-10) 
The witness was a police officer who approached Mr. Wickham's 
parked vehicle and testified to having observed several 
containers of beer in the vehicle. The officer did not testify 
as to whether he saw the juvenile drinking at the time he 
approached the vehicle, nor did he testify as to whether he 
inquired of the juvenile regarding when the juvenile had consumed 
the one and one-half beers. The exhibit consisted of two 
photographs of the beer in the vehicle. This was the only 
evidence presented by the State. 
The officer testified that he inquired as to the ages of the 
passengers and then administered a breath test to the juvenile, 
who was 14 or 15 years of age, after smelling alcohol on the 
juvenile's breath. A portable breath test on the juvenile 
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registered as 0.40. The juvenile, who originally denied having 
drank any alcohol changed his story and informed the police 
officer that he had drank one and one-half beers; however, as the 
officer testified, the juvenile refused to tell the officer who 
gave him the alcohol. (Tr. at p. 6, lines 5-6, 17-20) Again, the 
officer did not testify as to whether he saw the juvenile 
drinking at the time he approached the vehicle, nor did he 
testify as to whether he inquired of the juvenile regarding when 
the juvenile had consumed the one and one-half beers. 
The juvenile was not called as a witness and did not 
volunteer information to the officer as to who provided him with 
the alcohol that he had previously drank. (Tr. at p. 6, lines 5-
6, 17-20) There was no testimony offered or evidence presented to 
indicate that Mr. Wickham had any involvement in the juvenile's 
delinquent behavior. (Tr. at pp. 3-10) 
Given the testimony and evidence presented, the Court 
concluded that "without a reasonable doubt, Mr. Wickham provided 
the alcoholic beverages to [the minor],. . ." (Tr. at p. 7, lines 
13-16) and therefore was guilty of contributing to the 
delinquency of said minor; however, given the inconclusive 
testimony and evidence presented, it is difficult to see how a 
"reasonable person" could not maintain "a fair doubt" regarding 
Mr. Wickham's alleged guilt. 
Any person could have previously provided the minor with the 
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one and one-half beers that the minor informed the officer he had 
consumed. The officer himself testified that the juvenile 
refused to offer that information to him (Tr. at p. 6, lines 17-
20); therefore, there was no information received regarding who 
contributed to the delinquency of this minor. A reading on the 
portable breath test of 0.4 0 is low enough that it could have 
been from consuming the alcohol hours earlier in the day. Based 
upon reason and common sense, and growing out of the testimony 
and evidence offered to the Court in this case, any "reasonable 
person" would have "a fair doubt" regarding Mr. Wickham's alleged 
guilt in the matter. 
Simply having alcohol present with a minor who is not 
drinking it is not contributing to the delinquency of a minor. A 
minor having admitted to drinking one and one-half beers at some 
point during that day and then being in the presence of an adult 
does not make that adult guilty of contributing to the 
delinquency of that minor. As set forth in 1999 WL 93222, State 
v. Krueger, (Utah App. 1999), an interpretation of the language 
of UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3A-801 (1) (A) (I) provides for "the prosecution 
of a person 18 or older who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids, or acts with a minor to 
violate a specific state, federal, or local law." (emphasis 
added) Krueger relies upon the analysis made by the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Tritt, 23 Utah 2d 365, 463 P.2d 806 (Utah 
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1970)where it states the following with regard to the words 
"delinquency" and "contributing to the delinquency": 
. . .it denotes actions that will aid, encourage or 
involve children in conduct which is contrary to law, 
or which is so contrary to the generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality that its result will 
be substantially harmful to the mental, moral or 
physical well-being of the child. 
No testimony was offered nor evidence presented to the Trial 
Court that showed that Mr. Wickham solicited, requested, 
commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided, or acted with the 
minor involved to violate a specific state, federal, or local 
law. (Tr. at pp. 3-10) In Krueger, the Court found that 
encouraging minors to even "remain delinquent" is sufficient for 
a finding that an adult contributed to that minor's delinquent 
behavior; however, no testimony or evidence was offered that Mr. 
Wickham even knew about the minor's delinquent behavior, nor that 
he supported or encouraged the minor to remain delinquent. (Tr. 
at pp. 3-10) The only testimony and evidence offered showed that 
Mr. Wickham had alcohol in the presence of a minor who was not 
drinking it, all of which conclusively is not statutorily 
considered contributing to the delinquency of a minor. If such 
behavior were to be considered contributing to the delinquency of 
a minor, individuals who simply kept alcohol in their home where 
their children reside would be guilty of such a crime. 
Possession of alcohol in the presence of minors does not 
make one guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a minor 
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unless that adult "aids, encourages or involves children in 
conduct which is contrary to law, or which is so contrary to the 
generally accepted standards of decency and morality that its 
result will be substantially harmful to the mental, moral or 
physical well-being of the child." The State failed to prove 
these actions occurred on Mr. Wickham's part or that Mr. Wickham 
maintained any intent necessary with regard to the delinquent 
behavior of the minor involved in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant/Appellant respectfully 
requests that this Court enter an order reversing the Trial 
Court's decision; or in the alternative, remand the matter to the 
Trial Court for a new trial to be held in the matter. 
DATED THIS 0>£k day of August, 1999. 
^ w y. j bus, 
H^ppy J . Morgan 
At torney fo r Appe l lan t 
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160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
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Addendum ~I~ 
FILED 
MAR 0 2 1999 
SEVbNTHDlSrR/CT 
^VENJLE COuRT 
SEVENTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
JESSIE T. WICKHAM 
Defendant 
MINUTES, ORDER AND 
DECREE 
Case No.: 934947 
Tape: J99-4 VIDEO Counter: 14:30 
Court is in Session: February 25, 1999 
Type & Charge: #001-Contributing to Delinquency 
Present: Jessie T. Wickham, defendant, William L. Benge, County Attorney, Robynn 
Parker, DYC, Clark Messick, Bailiff; Pamela A. Bridwell, Clerk; S. Don 
LeBaron, Judge. 
This matter came before the Court for trial. 
The parties were advised of their rights pursuant to Rule 18 of the Juvenile Court Rules 
and Procedures. 
The State calls Shawn Hansen who is sworn and examined. State introduced exhibit #1-
2 pictures of alcohol. There being no objection same is received. The State rests their case. 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: 
Incident #001 is found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the evidence 
presented to the Court. Further, that said defendant comes within the provisions of the Juvenile 
Court Act. 
The County Attorney recommends a sentence of 90 days to be served consecutive to 
anytime defendant is now serving. No recommendation as to fine. 
NOW THEREFORE AS DISPOSITION FOR INCIDENT #001-CONTRIBUTING 
TO THE DELINQUENCY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
THAT: 
Defendant is committed to Grand County Jail to serve 120 days. Time is to be served 
consecutive to any time being served on prior court orders. 
MINUTES, ORDER AND DECREE 
DATE: FEBRUARY 25,1999 
CASE NAME AND NUMBER: JESSIE T. WICKHAM-934947 
PAGE 2 
That defendant pay a fine plus surcharge of $500.00 with payment due within 2 months 
of his release from jail. Payments are to be made to the Seventh District Juvenile Court, 125 East 
Center, Moab, Utah, 84532. 
Failure to comply with the order of this Court may result in your being found in contempt, 
loss of driver's license, forfeiture of income tax refund and could result in additional penalties and/or 
a commitment to jail. 
You have the right to appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. Appeals must be filed within 
30 days. 
Dated this 25th day of February, 1999.. 
& ^ 4 " ^¥,THE COURT: 
^ • \ ; , 7 - : : ; '*" S. Don LeBaron, Judge 
Copies mailed/hand delivered/faxed this jf£__73ay of February, 1999, to: 
4 S f ••••••' ' • • - . William L. Benge, County Attorney, 125 East Center, J<loab? Utah, 84532 \ 
Jessie T. WJckham in care of the Grand County Jail ft * f :<?-> ; - %v\ >, \ 
Deputy Court Clerk ' '. A ^ ; 4 / / 
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342 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee 
v. 
John M. HEATON/ Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 950238. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 1, 1998. 
Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Ogden 
Department, Michael J. Glassman, J., of aggravated robbery and 
evading arrest. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Russon, 
J., held that: (1) burden of complying with the detainer statute 
was on the prosecutor, not the defendant; (2) delay occasioned by 
court clerk's error did not constitute good cause for delay under 
detainer statute; (3) extending trial date to a reasonable time 
outside detainer statute's 120-day disposition period to 
accommodate, in part, defense counsel's schedule constituted good 
cause for the delay under the statute; and (4) defendant did not 
knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional right to 
appointed counsel. 
Reversed. 
1. CRIMINAL LAW kll34(3) 
110 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General 
110kll34 Scope and Extent in General 
110kll34(3) Questions considered in general. 
Utah 1998. 
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss under detainer statute 
was reviewed for correctness, where decision was based on legal 
conclusion that clerk's administrative mistake could excuse 
prosecutor's duty to bring charges to trial within statutory time 
limit. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1(1, 3, 4). 
2. CRIMINAL LAW k735 
110 
110XX Trial 
110XX(F) Province of Court and Jury in General 
110k733 Questions of Law or of Fact 
110k735 Mixed questions of law and fact. 
Utah 1998. 
Whether a waiver of counsel was made knowingly and 
intelligently is a mixed question of law and fact. 
3. CRIMINAL LAW kll34(3) 
110 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General 
110kll34 Scope and Extent in General 
110kll34(3) Questions considered in general. 
Utah 1998. 
Supreme Court reviews trial court's legal determinations for 
correctness. 
4. EXTRADITION AND DETAINERS k5 9 
166 
166II Detainers 
166k59 Time for trial. 
Utah 1998. 
Burden of complying with the detainer statute was on the 
prosecutor, not the defendant, and thus, the defendant did not 
have the responsibility to find out why his case had not been 
sent for trial. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1. 
5. EXTRADITION AND DETAINERS k59 
166 
166II Detainers 
166k59 Time for trial. 
Utah 1998. 
Even though most of delay in bringing defendant to trial was 
occasioned by court clerk's error, this did not constitute good 
cause under detainer statute for delay since the prosecutor was 
not relieved of its burden of complying with the statute. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1(1, 3, 4 ) . 
6. EXTRADITION AND DETAINERS k5 9 
166 
166II Detainers 
166k59 Time for trial. 
Utah 1998. 
When a prisoner delivers written notice pursuant to detainer 
statute, prosecutor has affirmative duty to have defendant's 
matter heard within statutory period; implicit in this duty is 
duty to notify court that detainer notice has been filed and to 
make good faith effort to comply with statute. U.C.A.1953, 77-
29-1(1, 3, 4) . 
7. EXTRADITION AND DETAINERS k5 9 
166 
166II Detainers 
166k59 Time for trial. 
Utah 1998. 
Since the detainer statute places on the prosecutor alone the 
burden of bringing case to trial within 120-day period, the 
prosecutor's duty must be independent of the court's docketing 
system. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1. 
8. CRIMINAL LAW kll34(6) 
110 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General 
110kll34 Scope and Extent in General 
110kll34(6) Theory and grounds of decision in lower 
court. 
Utah 1998. 
Even if lower court erred in its legal conclusions, Supreme 
Court may affirm trial court's decision on any reasonable legal 
basis, provided that any rationale for affirmance finds support 
in the record. 
9. EXTRADITION AND DETAINERS k5 9 
166 
166II Detainers 
166k59 Time for trial. 
Utah 1998. 
Deciding whether the district court properly denied 
defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to detainer statute 
requires two-step inquiry: first, Supreme Court must determine 
when the 120-day period commenced and when it expired, second, if 
trial was held outside the 120-day period, Supreme Court must 
then determine whether good cause excused the delay. U.C.A.1953, 
77-29-1. 
10. EXTRADITION AND DETAINERS k59 
166 
166II Detainers 
166k59 Time for trial. 
Utah 1998. 
Detainer statute's 120-day disposition period must be extended 
by amount of time during which prisoner himself creates delay. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1. 
11. EXTRADITION AND DETAINERS k59 
166 
166II Detainers 
166k59 Time for trial. 
Utah 1998. 
Extending trial date to a reasonable time outside detainer 
statute's 120-day disposition period to accommodate, in part, 
defense counsel's schedule constituted good cause for the delay 
under the statute. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1(3, 4). 
12. CRIMINAL LAW k641.4(4) 
110 
110XX Trial 
110XX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in General 
110k641 Counsel for Accused 
110k641.4 Waiver of Right to Counsel 
110k641.4(4) Validity and sufficiency, particular 
cases> 
[See headnote text below] 
12. CRIMINAL LAW k641.7(1) 
110 
110XX Trial 
110XX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in General 
110k641 Counsel for Accused 
110k641.7 Affirmative Duties in Protection of Right 
110k641.7(l) In general; advice, preliminary inquiry 
and appointment by court. 
Utah 1998. 
Defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his 
constitutional right to appointed counsel, even though court 
refused to dismiss defense counsel, recommended that defendant 
rely on counsel during voir dire and strongly advised that he 
allow counsel to cross-examine state's witnesses, where trial 
court failed to advise defendant, at a minimum, of dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation, and had already allowed 
defendant to proceed pro se when warnings involving defense 
counsel were issued. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
13. CRIMINAL LAW k641.4(1) 
110 
110XX Trial 
110XX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in General 
110k641 Counsel for Accused 
110k641.4 Waiver of Right to Counsel 
110k641.4(1) In general; right to appear pro se. 
Utah 1998. 
Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused right to self-
representation, provided only that he knowingly and intelligently 
forgoes his right to counsel. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
14. CRIMINAL LAW k641.4(2) 
110 
110XX Trial 
110XX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in General 
110k641 Counsel for Accused 
110k641.4 Waiver of Right to Counsel 
110k641.4(2) Capacity and requisites in general. 
Utah 1998. 
When a trial court is confronted with defendant who either 
refuses to proceed to trial with appointed counsel or insists on 
proceeding pro se, court must carefully consider defendant's 
right to self-representation with his right to counsel. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 6. 
15. CRIMINAL *911 LAW k641.7(l) 
110 
110XX Trial 
110XX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in General 
110k641 Counsel for Accused 
110k641.7 Affirmative Duties in Protection of Right 
110k641.7(l) In general; advice, preliminary inquiry 
and appointment by court. 
Utah 1998. 
Before trial court may permit defendant to proceed without 
assistance of counsel, court must conduct thorough inquiry of 
defendant to fulfill its duty of insuring that defendant's waiver 
of counsel is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made; in 
making this determination, the court must advise defendant of 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation so that the 
record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his 
choice is made with eyes open. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
16. CRIMINAL LAW k641.7(1) 
110 
110XX Trial 
110XX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in General 
110k641 Counsel for Accused 
110k641.7 Affirmative Duties in Protection of Right 
110k641.7(1) In general; advice, preliminary inquiry 
and appointment by court. 
Utah 1998. 
In addition to advising defendant of dangers and disadvantages 
of self-representation before permitting defendant to proceed 
without assistance of counsel, trial court should (1) advise 
defendant of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel, 
as well as his constitutional right to represent himself, (2) 
ascertain that defendant possesses intelligence and capacity to 
understand and appreciate consequences of decision to represent 
himself, including expectation that defendant will comply with 
technical rules and recognition that presenting defense is not 
just matter of telling one's story, and (3) ascertain that 
defendant comprehends nature of charges and proceedings, range of 
permissible punishments, and any additional facts essential to 
broad understanding of case. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
17. CRIMINAL LAW kll39 
110 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General 
110kll3 9 Additional proofs and trial de novo. 
Utah 1998. 
In the absence of a colloquy on the record between the court 
and the defendant determining the validity of a waiver of 
counsel, Supreme Court will look at record and make de novo 
determination regarding validity of defendant's waiver only in 
extraordinary circumstances, the existence of which the Court 
will address on a case-by-case basis. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
*912 Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Kris Leonard, Asst. Att'y Gen., 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
Candace S. Bridgess, Kent E. Snider, Ogden, for defendant and 
appellant. 
RUSSON, Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant John M. Heaton appeals a judgment entered on a jury 
verdict finding him guilty of aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, and evading arrest, a third degree felony. We reverse. 
*913 BACKGROUND 
Because some of the dates corresponding to the facts in this 
case are critical to the resolution of this appeal, we provide a 
detailed chronological summary of the relevant events. 
On July 13, 1994, Heaton was arrested for the robbery of an 
Albertson's grocery store in Roy, Utah. The next day, Heaton 
waived his right to a preliminary hearing and was bound over to 
district court. Heaton was a parolee at the time, and on July 
26, he was returned to the Utah State Prison for violating his 
parole. Heaton also qualified for public assistance and was 
appointed counsel from the public defender's office. On August 
2, Heaton appeared in district court for arraignment, at which 
time he pleaded "not guilty" to the charges and the judge set a 
pretrial conference for August 3 0 and a jury trial for September 
9. On August 25, while incarcerated at the prison, Heaton filed 
a written request for final disposition of all matters pending 
against him pursuant to Utah Code Ann. s 77-29-1 (the "detainer 
statute"), which requires the prosecutor to bring pending charges 
against a prisoner to trial within 120 days from the date the 
notice is delivered to certain state officials or their agents. 
An authorized agent at the prison received Heaton's notice on 
September 3. (FN1) 
At his pretrial conference on August 30, Heaton requested a 
preliminary hearing, which he had initially waived. The 
prosecution had no objection, and the parties and the court 
agreed to hold a preliminary hearing on September 9, the date for 
which the trial had initially been set. At the September 9 
preliminary hearing, the court found that probable cause existed 
and set a second arraignment for September 27. At the second 
arraignment, Heaton requested that the judge recuse himself on 
the basis that the judge had also presided over Heaton's 
preliminary hearing. The judge recused himself and ordered the 
case reassigned. However, as a result of an error in the 
district court clerk's office, the case was not reassigned. In 
late November 1994, after receiving inquiry by a witness 
regarding the trial date, the prosecutor contacted the district 
court for a status report, whereupon the clerk's office 
discovered the error and reassigned the case to a different judge 
as previously ordered. 
On November 28, the district court sent the parties a notice 
of a trial-scheduling conference set for December 7. At that 
conference, the court initially attempted to set the trial date 
for January 19, 1995. However, because both defense counsel and 
the prosecutor had a scheduling conflict, the court set the trial 
for the next available date suitable for all the parties, 
February 16 and 17, 1995. (FN2) 
Subsequent to the trial-scheduling conference on December 7, 
1994, Heaton sent a letter to the court requesting new counsel. 
On February 8, 1995, the court held a hearing to address Heaton's 
request, which was based in part on his defense counsel's refusal 
to bring a motion to dismiss pursuant to the detainer statute. 
The court denied Heaton's request. On February 16, 1995, after 
reevaluating Heaton's claim, Heaton's defense counsel moved to 
dismiss pursuant to the detainer statute. The court, however, 
found that at least 60 days of the 71-day delay--i.e., the period 
between the second arraignment and the trial-scheduling 
conference--were attributable to the administrative error in the 
clerk's office. This delay, the court concluded, constituted 
"good cause" under the statute, and the court therefore denied 
the motion. 
Although originally scheduled for February 16 and 17, 1995, 
the trial was not actually held until April 20 and 21, 1995. 
(FN3) Before trial, Heaton filed a pro se motion requesting that 
the judge recuse himself and requesting new counsel. A hearing 
was held on April 19, 1995, and the judge denied both requests. 
During the hearing, Heaton indicated that he did not feel he 
was receiving adequate legal representation and that he felt 
forced to *914 proceed on his own. His attorney indicated that 
a "rift" had developed between them, that he was uncomfortable 
going to trial because of the "total conflict" between them, and 
that he thought Heaton wanted to represent himself. Heaton did 
not assert his right to self-representation, and the judge did 
not ask Heaton whether he wished to waive his right to counsel. 
Instead, the judge (1) advised Heaton of his right to self-
representation, (2) refused to permit Heaton's counsel to 
withdraw, (3) indicated to Heaton that he was requiring counsel 
to remain as standby counsel to assist Heaton if he wanted the 
assistance, and (4) indicated that Heaton was free to choose to 
handle trial matters on his own but that the court would make a 
record of Heaton's decision to proceed pro se. 
Although Heaton's defense counsel assisted Heaton in selecting 
the jury, Heaton represented himself at trial. The jury 
convicted Heaton on both charges, and he was sentenced to serve 
concurrent terms of five years to life and zero to five years at 
the Utah State Prison, such terms to be served consecutively to 
any sentences Heaton was already serving. 
On appeal, Heaton alleges the following errors: (1) the trial 
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to the 
detainer statute; (2) he was denied his constitutional right to 
counsel; (3) he was denied his constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel; and (4) the prosecutor's misconduct 
during closing argument constituted reversible error. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1] The trial court's decision to deny Heaton's motion to 
dismiss v/as based on its legal conclusion that under the detainer 
statute the clerk's administrative mistake could excuse the 
prosecutor's duty to bring Heaton's charges to trial within the 
12 0-day period. Because this is a legal, rather than a factual, 
conclusion, we review the trial court's decision for correctness. 
See State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991). 
[2] [3] Whether a waiver of counsel was made knowingly and 
intelligently is a mixed question of law and fact. We review the 
trial court's legal determinations for correctness. See State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-39 (Utah 1994); Harding v. Lewis, 834 
F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir.1987). 
ANALYSIS 
[4] Heaton first argues that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to dismiss pursuant to the detainer statute. That 
statute provides, in relevant part: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment 
in the state prison, jail or other penal or correctional 
institution of this state, and there is pending against the 
prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, 
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of 
the same, a written demand specifying the nature of the charge 
and the court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition 
of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of 
written notice. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in 
Subsection (1), the prosecuting attorney or the defendant or 
his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with the 
prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 
120 days, or within such continuance as has been granted, and 
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the action, the 
court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that 
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter 
heard within the time required is not supported by good cause, 
whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not, the 
court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice. 
Utah Code Ann. s 77-29-1(1), (3), & (4) (emphasis added). 
In denying Heaton's motion to dismiss, the district court made 
the following ruling: 
[T]his Court is going to deny the Defendant's [motion on] the 
basis that I believe 
*915 that there has been good cause [.] And that term 
doesn't quite fit in this situation, but explainable cause 
shown as to why the delay occurred. And the Court does not 
find in any way that it was as a result of the 
prosecution's dragging its feet. 
The facts are that the bulk of the delay, 60 days at least 
of it, was the fault probably of the Clerk's office in this 
case. And again I don't know whether that fits into what 
could be called a good cause shown, but the Court believes 
that it happens from time to time, that there can be that kind 
of a glitch. 
And certainly the Defendant could have pushed to find out 
why his case had not been set for trial. [He] [c]ould have 
pushed his counsel to make that request, [a]nd was in the same 
position [as was] the State.... 
The case sat. And it is unfortunate it did, but the Court 
will deny the motion at this time. 
The district court's ruling contradicts section 77-29-1 and 
our prior case law. The statute requires the prosecutor "to have 
the matter heard within the time required." Utah Code Ann. s 77-
29-1(4). Moreover, this court has consistently held that the 
language of the detainer statute clearly places the burden of 
complying with the statute on the prosecutor. See Petersen, 810 
P.2d at 424; State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P.2d 158, 160 
(1969). In Petersen, the trial court asked the defendant whether 
the trial date was acceptable, and the defendant did not object 
to the date, which was outside the 12 0-day period. Nevertheless, 
this court concluded that the defendant was not required to 
object to the trial date in order to maintain his rights under 
the statute because the burden of bringing the case to trial 
within the disposition period rested solely with the prosecution. 
810 P.2d at 424. Thus, in the case at bar, the court clearly 
erred in concluding that Heaton was in the same position as was 
the State and therefore shared some of the responsibility to find 
out why his case had not been set for trial. 
[5] The trial court further erred in its legal conclusion that 
the 71-day delay, most of which was occasioned by the court 
clerk's error, constituted "good cause" and thereby relieved the 
prosecutor of its burden under the statute. We first note that 
the judge's finding that the State did not contribute to the 
delay carries little significance. The mere fact that the delay 
was not caused by the prosecutor has never been considered 
dispositive because "to hold that good cause is supported by the 
lone fact that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor would 
contradict the language in section 77-29-1(4) which places the 
burden of complying with the statute on the prosecution." Id. at 
426; see also Wilson, 453 P.2d at 159-60 (reversing trial 
court's decision not to dismiss, notwithstanding fact that 
prosecution did not cause delay). 
[6] [7] The State argues that while it could have followed up 
on the case earlier, "defendant cites no precedent for 
attributing to the prosecutor the responsibility for anticipating 
or preventing unexpected and infrequent administrative mistakes 
made by court personnel." We agree with the State that it is 
not responsible for the administrative mistakes of the court. 
Nevertheless, it is responsible for complying with section 77-29-
1. Because the statute places on the prosecutor alone the burden 
of bringing the case to trial within the 120-day period, the 
prosecutor's duty must be independent of the court's docketing 
system. While Heaton's case fell victim to an administrative 
"glitch" at the clerk's office, his case also fell through a 
crack in the prosecutor's office. Even though the prosecutor's 
office received Heaton's detainer notice on September 8, 1994, 
neither the briefs nor our review of the record indicates that 
the prosecutor even addressed Heaton's detainer notice to the 
court until February 16, 1995, after the disposition period had 
already expired. When a prisoner delivers a written notice 
pursuant to the detainer statute, the prosecutor has an 
affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter heard within the 
statutory period. Implicit in this duty is the duty to notify 
the court that a detainer notice has been filed and to make a 
good faith effort to comply with the statute. This is not to say 
that the prosecutor must succeed, for "good cause" may support 
the prosecutor's *916 failure to comply. However, where the 
prosecutor's failure is inaction--in this case, doing nothing 
whatsoever to bring Heaton's case to trial within the statutory 
period--the trial court may not conclude that the prosecutor's 
failure is supported by "good cause." 
[8] [9] Nevertheless, even if the lower court erred in its 
legal conclusions, this court may affirm a trial court's decision 
on any reasonable legal basis, provided that any rationale for 
affirmance finds support in the record. See K & T, Inc. v. 
Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994); Hill v. Seattle First 
Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992). Deciding whether the 
district court properly denied Heaton's motion to dismiss 
pursuant to the detainer statute requires a two-step inquiry. 
First, we must determine when the 12 0-day period commenced and 
when it expired. Second, if the trial was held outside the 120-
day period, we must then determine whether "good cause" excused 
the delay. 
[10] The detainer statute clearly provides that the 120-day 
period commences on the date the written notice is delivered "to 
the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any 
appropriate agent of the same." Utah Code Ann. s 77-29-1(1); 
see also State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985) (holding 
that 120-day disposition period commences from date of delivery 
of written notice to warden, not from date defense counsel files 
notice of appearance). However, this court has held that when a 
prisoner himself acts to delay the trial, he indicates his 
willingness to temporarily waive his right to a speedy trial. 
Thus, the disposition period must be extended by the amount of 
time during which the prisoner himself creates the delay. See 
State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982) (concluding 
that where defendant's trial date was originally scheduled less 
than one month after defendant's request for disposition and 
court granted defendant's request for continuance, defendant was 
responsible for number of days during which continuance was 
granted and could not include those days in disposition period). 
In the case at bar, the 120-day disposition period commenced 
on September 3, 1994, because that is the date on which an 
authorized agent at the prison received Heaton's written notice. 
However, Heaton did cause a trial delay. As set forth above, the 
court initially scheduled trial for September 9, 1994. At his 
pretrial conference on August 30, Heaton requested a preliminary 
hearing, which he had initially waived. The prosecutor having no 
objection, the court granted Heaton's request, changing the trial 
date to the preliminary hearing date. But for Heaton's request 
for a preliminary hearing, his case would have been brought to 
trial on September 9, just 6 days after his written notice had 
been delivered. Thus, Heaton delayed his own trial and indicated 
his willingness to temporarily waive his rights under the 
detainer statute. See Velasquez, 641 P.2d at 116. 
When the court changed Heaton's trial date to the preliminary 
hearing date, in effect it continued Heaton's trial pending the 
outcome of the preliminary hearing. Had the court not found 
probable cause at the hearing, it would have had to dismiss the 
charges. See Utah R.Crim.P. 7(h)(3). However, the court did 
find probable cause and therefore scheduled a second arraignment 
for September 27. The court could not set a new trial date until 
Heaton entered his pleas at the second arraignment. Thus, 
because Heaton's trial date was continued for the purpose of 
accommodating his request for a preliminary hearing, and because 
a new trial date could not even have been considered until the 
second arraignment, Heaton may not include the 18 days between 
September 9 and September 27 as part of the 120-day disposition 
period. 
Excluding the 18-day delay attributable to Heaton, the State 
had until January 19, 1995, to bring Heaton to trial. Although 
the court initially attempted to set the trial for January 19, 
1995, it scheduled the trial beyond the disposition period 
because of the defense counsel's and prosecutor's scheduling 
conflict. Therefore, we must proceed to step two of our inquiry 
to determine whether continuing the trial to accommodate, in 
part, defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good cause" under 
section 77-29-1. 
*917 [11] A nearly identical issue was raised in State v. 
Bonny, 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P.2d 147 (1970), wherein the initially 
scheduled trial date fell within the disposition period, but 
because defense counsel had a scheduling conflict the court 
rescheduled the trial for five days beyond the disposition 
period. This court concluded that section 77-65-1, the 
predecessor to section 77-29-1, (FN4) permitted the court to 
grant " 'for a good cause shown in open court ... any necessary 
or reasonable continuance.' " Bonny, 477 P.2d at 147-48 (quoting 
Utah Code Ann. s 77-65-1). Thus, because the trial was 
rescheduled at defense counsel's request and to accommodate his 
schedule, this court held that the trial court had authority to 
grant such a continuance, which was "entirely reasonable and 
practical under the circumstances." Id. at 148. 
Because section 77-29-1(3) contains substantially the same 
language as section 77-65-1 and gives the court discretion to 
grant continuances, the reasoning in Bonny is applicable to the 
case at bar. The January 19, 1995, date initially offered by the 
trial court fell within the 120-day disposition period, and the 
court was therefore within its authority to grant a reasonable 
continuance under section 77-29-1(3) to accommodate defense 
counsel's schedule. In light of the other criminal trial both 
defense counsel and the prosecutor were engaged in, setting 
Heaton's trial one month beyond the disposition period was not 
unreBasonable. Therefore, we hold that while the district court 
erred in its legal conclusions, extending the trial date to a 
reasonable time outside the disposition period to accommodate, in 
part, defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good cause" under 
section 77-29-1(3) and (4), and the trial court correctly denied 
Heaton's motion to dismiss. 
[12] [13] We next address Heaton's argument that he did not 
knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional right to 
appointed counsel. The Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution guarantees an accused the right to the assistance of 
counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44, 83 
S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). If an accused 
is indigent, he is entitled to court-appointed counsel. See 
State v. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1986). However, 
the Sixth Amendment also guarantees an accused the right to self-
representation, "provided only that he [or she] knowingly and 
intelligently forgoes his [or her] right to counsel." McKaskle 
v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 
(1984); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 818, 
95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). 
The right to have the assistance of counsel in a criminal 
trial is a fundamental constitutional right which must be 
jealously protected by the trial court. The United States 
Supreme Court has stated: 
The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by 
counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, 
in which the accused--whose life or liberty is at stake--is 
without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and 
weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining 
whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the 
accused. 
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (emphasis added). 
Because of the importance of the right to counsel and the heavy 
burden placed upon the trial court to protect this right, there 
is a presumption against waiver, and doubts concerning waiver 
must be resolved in the defendant's favor. See, e.g., Johnson, 
304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (" ' [C]ourts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental 
constitutional rights." (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 
U.S. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937))); United 
States v. Williamson, 806 F.2d 216, 220 (10th Cir.1986) (doubts 
concerning waiver of counsel must be resolved in defendant's 
favor). 
[14] [15] [16] When a trial court is confronted with a 
defendant who either refuses to proceed to trial with appointed 
counsel or insists on proceeding pro se, the court must carefully 
consider the defendant's right to self-representation with his 
right to counsel. Nevertheless, before the court may permit the 
*918 defendant to proceed without the assistance of counsel, the 
court must conduct a thorough inquiry of the defendant to fulfill 
its duty of insuring that the defendant's waiver of counsel is 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. In making this 
determination, the court must advise the defendant of the dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation "so that the record will 
establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made 
with eyes open.' " Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 
(quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 
279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)); see Von Moltke v. 
Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948); 
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187-88 (Utah 1987). In 
addition, the trial court should (1) advise the defendant of his 
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, as well as his 
constitutional right to represent himself; (2) ascertain that 
the defendant possesses the intelligence and capacity to 
understand and appreciate the consequences of the decision to 
represent himself, including the expectation that the defendant 
will comply with technical rules and the recognition that 
presenting a defense is not just a matter of telling one's story; 
and (3) ascertain that the defendant comprehends the nature of 
the charges and proceedings, the range of permissible 
punishments, and any additional facts essential to a broad 
understanding of the case. See State v. Frye, 224 Conn. 253, 617 
A.2d 1382, 1386-87 (1992); see also Frampton, 131 P.2d at 187-
88. (FN5) 
This court stated in Frampton that a colloquy on the record 
between the court and the defendant is the preferred method of 
determining the validity of a waiver of counsel. Frampton, 131 
P.2d at 187. The reasoning behind this conclusion is that the 
information necessary for the court to make its determination 
generally "can only be elicited after penetrating questioning by 
the trial court." Id.; see also Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 724, 68 
S.Ct. 316 ("A judge can make certain that an accused's professed 
waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a 
penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the 
circumstances."). In Frampton, we also stated that in the 
absence of such a colloquy, we will look at any evidence in the 
record to determine whether the particular facts and 
circumstances support a valid waiver. 737 P.2d at 188. 
[17] However, in light of the foregoing discussion, this court 
is reluctant to assume the important responsibility which has 
been placed upon the trial court. After all, the trial court--
having the benefit of questioning the defendant and observing his 
demeanor--is in the best position to determine whether the 
defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his 
right to counsel. In contrast, this court's proper role is to 
review the trial court's findings and conclusions and then 
determine whether the trial court correctly concluded that the 
defendant validly waived counsel. A meaningful review of the 
trial court can take place only after that court has conducted a 
meaningful inquiry of the defendant. Therefore, in the absence 
of such a colloquy, this court will look at the record and make a 
de novo determination regarding the validity of the defendant's 
waiver only in extraordinary circumstances, the existence of 
which we will address on a case-by-case basis. See Harding, 834 
F.2d at 857. 
In the case at bar, the trial court clearly did not advise 
Heaton of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. 
The day before trial, during the hearing addressing Heaton's 
motion for new counsel, the trial judge stated: 
Now, with respect to counsel, you do have the right to 
represent yourself. I am not going to allow Mr. Caine's 
withdrawal at this point. Mr. Caine is a capable defense 
attorney. He is very familiar with the facts in your case. I 
am going to require that he remain on as counsel to assist you 
if you want the assistance. 
*919 
Mr. Heaton, if during the process of the Jury selection, 
and the defense that you want to present during the trial, you 
want to handle that on your own, you are free to do that. And 
you will be making that decision as you go. We will make a 
record of your decision to handle those matters on your own if 
that's your choice. 
My recommendation to you is that you rely on Mr. Caine's 
expertise and experience and have him help you. But you can 
make that choice. 
The court's cursory recommendation to Heaton to rely on 
defense counsel did not apprise Heaton in any way of the 
constitutional significance of the right to counsel and the 
consequences of waiver. The State argues that Heaton should have 
been aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation because on the day of trial, after the jury had 
been selected, the court strongly advised Heaton to allow defense 
counsel to cross-examine the State's witnesses inasmuch as Heaton 
would certainly not be as effective as defense counsel. While 
the court's advice was certainly appropriate, it addressed only 
one of the disadvantages of self-representation--!.e., not having 
experience and expertise in cross-examining witnesses. Moreover, 
the trial court had already determined that Heaton had decided to 
represent himself. As we have previously mentioned, before a 
trial court may permit a defendant to proceed pro se, the court 
must determine whether the defendant competently waived counsel 
at the time of waiver, not after. 
We therefore hold that because the trial court failed to 
advise Heaton, at a minimum, of the dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation, Heaton did not validly waive his 
constitutional right to counsel. The trial court erred in 
permitting Heaton to proceed pro se, and Heaton is entitled to a 
new trial. There are no extraordinary circumstances in this case 
which would justify our examination of the record and making a de 
novo determination as to whether Heaton knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel. Moreover, because the 
waiver of counsel issue is dispositive of this appeal, we need 
not address Heaton's other arguments. 
We reverse Heaton's convictions and order a new trial. 
HOWE, C.J., DURHAM, Associate C.J., and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, 
JJ., concur in Justice RUSSON's opinion. 
FN1. The prosecutor's office received the notice on September 8. 
The record does not indicate whether the district court 
received Heaton's detainer notice; however, the prosecutor 
stated that he believed the court probably received the notice 
on September 8, 1994. 
FN2. Defense counsel and the prosecutor were working on another 
criminal trial in mid-January. 
FN3. The reasons for the trial delay from February to April are 
not pertinent to this appeal. 
FN4. Section 77-29-1, enacted in 1980, replaced section 77-65-1. 
FN5. In Frampton, as a guide for trial courts, this court quoted 
a sixteen-point colloquy recommended to the federal courts for 
use when confronting a prospective pro se defendant. Frampton, 
737 P.2d at 187-88 n. 12 (citing Bench Book for United States 
District Court Judges, vol. 1, ss 1.02-2 to -5 (Federal Judicial 
Center, 3d ed. 1986)). Once again, we strongly recommend that 
trial courts use that approach, as it is an effective means by 
which to determine whether the defendant has validly waived his 
right to counsel. 
Addendum ~III~ 
78-3a-603 JUDICIAL CODE '516 
(10) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the 
Division of Youth Corrections regain jurisdiction and any 
authority previously exercised over the juvenile when there is 
an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the charges 
in the district court. 199$ 
78-3a-603. Certification hear ings — Juveni le court to 
hold preliminary hear ing — Factors consid' 
ered by juveni le court for waiver of j u r i s d i c 
t ion to district court. 
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Sub-
section 78-3a-502(3) alleges the commission of an act which 
would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the 
juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing. 
(2) At the preUminary hearing the state shall have the 
burden of going forward with its case and the burden of 
establishing: 
(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was commit-
ted and that the defendant committed it; and 
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be 
contrary to the best interests of the minor or of the public 
for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction. 
(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the 
best interests of the minor or of the public for the juvenile 
court to retain jurisdiction, the juvenile court shall consider, 
and may base its decision on, the finding of one or more of the 
following factors: 
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the 
protection of the community requires isolation of the 
minor beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities; 
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the 
minor in concert with two or more persons under circum-
stances which would s u b l e t the miiiOT to enhanced pen-
alties under Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult; 
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an 
aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner; 
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or 
property, greater weight being given to offenses against 
persons, except as provided in Section 76-8-418; 
(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by consid-
erations of his home, environment, emotional attitude, 
and pattern of living; 
(f) the record and previous history of the minor; 
(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use 
of facilities available to the juvenile court; 
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire 
offense in one court when the minor's associates in the 
alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a 
crime in the district court; 
(i) whether the minor used a firearm in the commission 
of an offense; and 
(j) whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon 
on or about school premises as provided in Section 76-IO 
505.5. 
(4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors 
listed in Subsection (3) is discretionary with the court. 
(5) (a) Written reports and other materials relating to the 
minors mental, physical, educational, and social history 
may be considered by the court. 
(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, 
guardian, or other interested party, the court shall require 
the person or agency preparing the report and other 
material to appear and be subject to both direct and 
cross-examination. 
(6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may 
testify under oath, call witnesses, cross-examine adverse 
witnesses, and present evidence on the factors required by 
Subsection (3). 
(7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under 
Subsection (2), the court may enter an order: 
(a) certifying that finding; and 
(b) directing that the minor be held for criminal pro-
ceedings in the district court. 
(8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the pre-
liminary examination held by the juvenile court need not 
include a finding of probable cause, but the juvenile court shall 
proceed in accordance with this section regarding the addi-
tional consideration referred to in Subsection (2)(b). 
(9) The provisions of Section 78-3a-116, Section 78-3a-913 
and other provisions relating to proceedings in juvenile cases 
are applicable to the hearing held under this section to the 
extent they are pertinent. 
(10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal 
proceedings in the district court is not entitled to a prelims 
nary examination in the district court. 
(11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district 
court shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal 
defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile 
court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accor-
dance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
(12) When a minor has been certified to the district court 
under this section or when a criminal information or indict-
ment is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction before a 
committing magistrate charging the minor with an offense 
described in Section 78-3a-602, the jurisdiction of the Division 
of Youth Corrections and the jurisdiction of the juvenile court 
over the minor is terminated regarding that offense, any other 
offenses arising from the same criminal episode, and any 
subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him, 
except as provided in Subsection (14). 
(13) A minor may be convicted under this section on the 
charges filed or on any other offense arising out of the same 
criminal episode. 
(14) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the 
Division of Youth Corrections regain jurisdiction and any 
authority previously exercised over the minor when there is 
an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the charges 
in the district court. 1997 
PART 8 
ADULT OFFENSES 
78-3a-801. Jurisdict ion of adults for offenses against 
minors — Proof of del inquency not required 
for convict ion. 
(1) The court shall have concurrent jurisdiction to try the 
following adults for offenses committed against minors: 
(a) any person 18 years of age or older who: 
(i) solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or in-
tentionally aids or who acts with a minor in the 
violation of any federal, state, or local law or munici-
pal ordinance; 
(ii) tends to cause minors to become or remain 
delinquent; or 
(iii) aids, contributes to, or becomes responsible for 
the neglect, abuse, or delinquency of any minor; 
(b) any person 18 years or older, having a minor in his 
legal custody, or under his care, or in his employment, 
who willfully abuses or ill-treats, neglects, or abandons 
the minor in any manner likely to cause the minor 
unnecessary suffering or serious injury to his health or 
morals; 
(c) any person 18 years or older who: 
(i) forcibly takes away a minor from, or wrongfully 
encourages him to leave, the legal or physical custody 
of any person, agency, or institution in which the 
minor lawfully resides or has been legally placed for 
the purpose of care, support, education, or adoption; 
or 
